Kants Theorie der Biologie: Ein Kommentar. Eine Lesart. Eine Historische Einordnung by Cooper, A
Kants Theorie der Biologie: Ein Kommentar. Eine Lesart. Eine historische Einordnung, 
by Ina Goy, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017, 420 pp., 109.95€ (hb), ISBN 3110471108. 
 
Introduction 
Ina Goy’s Kants Theorie der Biologie (KTB) is a landmark text, providing the first 
systematic account of Kant’s extensive reflections on organized beings. It is comprehensive 
in scope, displaying a remarkable attention to textual detail while maintaining a systematic 
view of the critical project. As a whole the book offers a reference text for scholars interested 
in the dense and often confusing argument of Part 2 of the third Critique, the Critique of the 
Teleological Power of Judgment. 115 of its 420 pages are dedicated to a line-by-line 
exposition of the relevant sections. It is thus well placed to legitimate and extend the growing 
body of work on Kant’s account of the life sciences. However, KTB is first and foremost an 
expository text; it does not put to bed those who are skeptical about Kant’s so-called 
‘biology’. 
There are several reasons that Kant’s account of organized beings has been hitherto 
neglected. In Metaphysical Foundations Kant sets a high bar for proper science: it must be 
‘systematic’, constitute an ‘interconnection of grounds and consequences’, and provide 
‘apodictic’ certainty (MF 4:468). Only mathematics and physics can meet the mark, while 
forms of empirical inquiry such as chemistry and the life sciences are improper, for they 
‘carry with them no consciousness of their necessity’. The problem is that a priori principles 
provide no guarantee that appearances are anything more than a ‘labyrinth of the multiplicity 
of possible empirical laws’ (FI 20:214). This is to say that the understanding has no grounds 
to expect that nature hangs together as a system. Those who have tried to salvage Kant’s 
account of living beings as a scientific enterprise, following Timothy Lenoir (1982), have 
been highly criticized on two fronts: for projecting contemporary problems onto Kant 
(Richards 2000), and, more seriously, for denaturalising biology (Zammito 2006). 
Despite the title, Goy’s book does not directly address the question of Kant and 
biology. Her argument instead aims to ground Kant’s theory of organized beings not as a 
proper science but as the key to completing the critical system of knowledge. To this end Goy 
opens with Kant’s three famous questions, ‘What can I know? What ought I to do? What may 
I hope?’ (CPR A805/B833). ‘Kant does not simply answer these three questions in the 
Religion,’ she claims, for ‘he first and foremost answers them in the three Critiques’ (KTB 
Vorwort). As Kant mentions in the first Critique, the third question is particularly important 
to the system of critical philosophy, for it concerns ‘the practical and the theoretical together’ 
(CPR A805/B833). Yet it is for that reason the most difficult to answer. Goy’s claim is that 
the question of hope is not simply a matter of religion, to be found in the idea future rewards. 
Rather, Kant’s project in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, and especially in his theory 
of organized beings, aims to provide an answer in this world. The beauty and organization we 
discover in nature demonstrates nature’s purposive form in such a way that harmonizes the 
practical and theoretical spheres. While plants, animals, and humans themselves feature as 
objects of the understanding, Kant aims to show that they also feature as purposive objects of 
nature to the extent that they realize the law of freedom in nature. The embedment of 
purposive form ‘allows humanity to hope that the purposive form that produces itself in 
nature can satisfy the demand of pure practical reason’ (KTB Vorwort). Thus ‘the world, in 
which humans are able to think of themselves as a free and rational beings, and nature, in 
which humans live and play the role of law-governed, natural beings, cease to fall apart.’ 
Biology might not be a proper science, but it confirms and grounds the critical system. 
Goy’s reconstruction of Kant’s theory of biology falls into three parts: a commentary, 
an interpretation, and a historical classification. I will consider these briefly in the following. 
 
A commentary 
The first part of the book (Ein Kommentar) provides a ‘summary of each text up to 
1790 in which Kant develops a theory of organized beings or part of such a theory’ (KTB 3). 
The comprehensiveness of Goy’s work is quite stunning, if not a little overburdened; she 
works though ‘Universal Natural History’, the ‘Argument’ essay, Kant’s three essays on race, 
the review of Herder’s ‘Ideen’, Metaphysical Foundations, the passages on teleology in the 
first and second Critiques, Kant’s ‘Theological Principles’ essay, and – most extensively – 
the Critique of the Power of Judgment. While the second part of the third Critique, the 
Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment, is often viewed as a surprising addition to 
the critical program, summarizing Kant’s rather eclectic fusion of epigenesis and 
preformationism, Goy shows that the teleological investigation of living things is native to 
Kant’s voluminous project, both predating and enduring beyond the so-called critical turn of 
1781. While Kant employs a teleological method in ‘Universal natural history’, it is ‘from 
1775 [that] the analysis of the emergent principles of organizing beings enters more strongly 
in the foreground’ (KTB 4). As Kant examines the historical claims made by natural 
historians in the domain ‘where theory abandons us’, as Kant puts it in ‘Teleological 
Principles’ (TP 8:157), he searches for a method analogous to that used in the physical 
sciences. His struggle to elaborate a theory of human development, the progress of his critical 
epistemology, his encounter with Herder in the mid-1780s, and his critical examination of 
teleological judgment work together to reveal what Goy labels ‘Kant’s theory of organized 
beings’ (KTB 1). 
In the bulk of this part, Goy provides a detailed commentary of the introduction and 
the ‘Analytic’ (§§61-8), ‘Dialectic’ (§§69-78), and ‘Doctrine of Method’ (§§79-91) of the 
Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment. In the ‘Analytic’ Kant describes organized 
nature, which, according to Goy, is characterized through two forms of law: ‘the mechanical 
and the physical-teleological’ (KTB 138). In the ‘Dialectic’ Kant presents organized nature in 
such a way that ‘the empirical manifold can be explained through both forms of powers and 
laws of nature, without both forms of power and laws of nature becoming caught in a 
contradiction.’ While many studies of Kant’s biology skip over the ‘Doctrine of Method’, 
Goy examines it as the capstone of both the third Critique and the critical project as such. 
Teleological judgment invites and also requires an expansive view of nature that includes a 
form of the physicotheological and moral proofs for das Dasein Gottes (KTB 183). Against 
those who try to naturalize Kant’s biology, Goy contends that only by uniting the different 
perspectives evoked in the ‘Analytic’ and the ‘Dialectic’ in the representation of a divine 
intellect can we coherently account for organized beings, drawing the theoretical and practical 
perspectives of rational beings into a unified experience of nature. 
 
An interpretation 
In the second part of the book (Eine Lesart), Goy moves from a textual to a 
systematic reading of Kant’s theory of organized beings. She proposes six theses, which I will 
simply list here for the sake of brevity. From ‘the perspective of the human power of 
judgment’, organized beings are 
 
1. machines, for they consist of mechanical movements and alterations that fall under 
mechanical powers and laws (2.1) 
2. physical-teleological beings, for their mechanical movements and alterations are 
directed toward the fulfillment of natural purposes (2.2) 
3. moral-teleological beings, for the various natural ends find their ultimate unity in 
moral purposes (2.3) 
 
The first three perspectives of organized beings can be summarized as mechanical, physical-
teleological, and moral-teleological. Yet the application of these three ways of viewing the 
powers and laws governing organized beings begs the question of their agreement. This opens 
a new line of inquiry for Kant. The human idea of organized beings allows for belief in the 
regulative idea of God and God’s creation, for only a non-human consciousness could 
represent and produce their unity. Thus the human power of judgment allows for three further 
perspectives: organized beings 
 
4. are characterized by mechanical and physical-teleological powers and laws of nature 
(2.5) 
5. are characterized by physical- and moral-teleological powers and laws (2.5) 
6. allow humans to believe in a regulative idea of God; a God who represents the unity 
of the powers and laws of nature and morality and thereby grounds their 
compatibility for the human perspective (2.7) 
 
While the first three theses characterize organized beings from ‘the human standpoint’, the 
second three characterize organized beings from ‘a humanly possible representation of a 
divine standpoint and the unity of a divine order’ (KTB 188). By emphasizing the theological 
implications of Kant’s theory of biology, Goy is critical of Hannah Ginsborg’s (2014) 
influential reading of the third Critique in terms of ‘primitive normativity’, a normativity that 
can be derived simply from the free play of the human faculties. For Goy, Ginsborg’s reading 
removes Kant’s theory from its theological bedding, undermining the critical and regulative 
status of organization. Goy is also critical of Angela Breitenbach’s (2009, 85) reading of 
organized beings as understood through ‘an analogy with our own reason’, for it leaves 
‘undeveloped’ the unity of the different powers and laws of nature, and the unity of the 
different powers and morality (KTB 190). Her reading is much closer to scholars such as 
Rachael Zuckert (2007), Paul Guyer (2005) and John Zammito (1992), who recognize the 
moral-teleological dimension of Kant’s theory. 
 
A historical classification 
 In the third part (Eine historische Einordnung) Goy outlines the ‘systematic 
relationships between Kant’s theory of organized beings and historical currents in the natural 
science of the 17th and 18th centuries’ (KTB 287). Again following her rigorously systematic 
approach, Goy works through the ovist and animalculist forms of preformationism, 
mechanical and vital epigenesis, and the many systems of classification advanced by the likes 
of Harvey, Linnaeus, Buffon, Maupertuis, Wolff, and Blumenbach. Her argument in this part 
is that ‘one can understand Kant’s position as a weak (critical, regulative, interpretive) theory 
of preformationism’, for he works with the ‘regulative idea of a creation in a material and 
formal sense’. Critical epistemology simply does not grant a stronger theory of a formative, 
vital power. Goy’s account covers familiar terrain, and yet is comprehensive and extremely 
helpful in understanding the motivation behind Kant’s theory. Her argument that Kant’s 
notion of the ‘formative power’ or Bildungsteib is taken not simply from Blumenbach but 
also from Wolff is compelling, developing a richer account than that begun in Goy (2014).  
Against standard classifications, which place Kant in the vitalist (Zumbach 1984) or 
vital materialist (Huneman 2006, Zammito 2003) camps, Goy carefully works through Kant’s 
many works to show that his position is not so easily pinned down. Kant represents 
preformationism as much as epigenesis, Goy claims (KTB 347), which provides further 
evidence for her six theses outlined in Part 2. Kant grants to the life sciences an epigenetic 
power and epigenetic laws ‘insofar as he describes a formative power and physical-
teleological laws, which create the purposive form of matter, and cause the automatic 
production (not simply cloning or developing) of the species called into life by God, the 
production and preservation of individuals in a species, and the parts of individuals’ (KTB 
384). Generation for Kant is thus both genuine and yet the result of ‘the idea of God in the 
beginning and the idea of God as the highest purpose at the end of creation.’ His theory of 
germs and natural endowments retains this element of preformationism, especially in his 
essays on race, and yet his account of generation, particularly in the third Critique, entails a 
robust account of production. Goy contends that these two moments of Kant’s thought can 
only be maintained if we interpret Kant through her six theses, which subordinate formative 
powers and physical-teleological laws to divine ends. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The controversial claim of Goy’s book is that Kant has a theory of biology at all. Yet 
she does not provide this claim with an explicit defense. From the outset she recognizes that 
‘Kant wrote about organized beings in a time when biology as a scientific discipline was not 
yet established under its own name’ (KTB 5). The investigation of living beings in Kant’s 
time covered a range of ‘academic disciplines, including natural history and the description of 
nature, physiology, physics, medicine, anatomy and theology.’ Yet by naming Kant’s theory 
of organized beings a theory of biology, one is left wondering how Kant’s difficult and unique 
account of organization is related to the subsequent history of biology opened by Treviranus 
and exploded by Darwin. Goy’s reading certainly provides evidence against the view that 
Kant’s theory anticipated a constitutive account of generation (Lenoir 1982) or that it can be 
naturalized (Wood 1999). Yet its implications for contemporary debates about function and 
purpose in contemporary biology remains unexplored. Goy’s concern for Kant’s theory of 
organized beings overlooks recent interest in Kant’s notion of a ‘research program’ (Butts 
1990, Kitcher 1986). Did Kant’s theory hamper or enable the biological research undertaken 
by the Göttingen School and the German vital materialists of the 19th century? Can Kant’s 
account shed light on current controversies in the philosophy of biology? A good deal of ink 
has been spilled over these questions, and the strength of KTB lies in its capacity to guide and 
inspire future work along textually rigorous lines. I have heard that Goy intends to work on an 
English translation in the near future. For the sake of advancing this conversation in the 
Anglophone world with the help of Goy’s rigor, I hope that it comes in the not-too-distant 
future. 
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